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Introduction
1 In  this  paper,  I  propose  to  establish  epistemological  foundations  for  the  study  of
specialised languages (SLs). Specialised languages, e.g. financial English, legal German
or medical Spanish, have gained in global importance over the last sixty years as an
increasing number of non-linguists have to use them in their professional or research
activities. Among them, the demand for English stands ahead in most fields, especially
in scientific, business and technical domains. Studies on these SLs have also developed
in proportion and the number of teaching and research papers has sharply increased
lately all over the world.
2 In spite of numerous notable advances and useful propositions in the field, this paper
suggests that their epistemological foundations remain shaky and that the study of SLs
does not yet form a structured domain of scientific research. The main problem to be
solved lies in the puzzling relationship that SLs establish between the language and
their “specialities” or specialised domains. This issue has been identified long ago, ever
since the study of SLs emerged, but it does not seem to have been addressed thoroughly
enough to provide solid foundations for research in the area.
3 The paper first examines why available definitions and approaches of SLs fall short of
expectations in providing a satisfactory building ground on which their study could be
established. Because of the global reach of English in many professional and research
activities, a special focus is put on “English for Specific Purposes” (ESP), the generally
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accepted  umbrella  name  given  to  the  study  of  “specialised  Englishes”  in  English-
speaking countries. In this part, I show that most perceptions of SLs characterise them
by the circumstantial conditions of communications where they are used and I argue
that  these  approaches,  although  true  in  their  observations  of  these  language
phenomena, cannot deliver what would be necessary to develop a robust scientific field
of  knowledge.  From  these  developments,  I  draw  the  conviction  that  the  general
linguistic angle of approach should be reversed and that the organising principle of a
theory of SLs should not be found in language but in the notion of specialisation.
4 In  the  second part,  I  develop this  premise  and I  suggest  that  specialisation can be
interpreted  as  a  form of  philosophical  intentionality.  Hence,  I  progressively  derive
interconnected  descriptions  of  specialised  domains,  specialised  communities  and
specialised languages. The third part, devoted to a study of the functionality of SLs,
shows that much in the pragmatic approach to linguistics is relevant to distinguish
specialised  from  general  language.  The  notion  of  “specialised  encyclopaedia”  is
proposed to account for the competence of interpreting coded specialised messages in
social and historical contexts. The discussion section examines the debatable character
of  the  theory,  the  issue  of  the  amount  and  nature  of  specialised  knowledge  to  be
mastered by teachers, and the legitimate use of specialised fiction (FASP). The ultimate
purpose of  the paper is  to  pave the way for  methodical  descriptions of  SLs  and to
structure disciplinary knowledge for  transmission to future generations of  teachers
and scholars.
 
1. Local conditions and objective knowledge on
specialised languages
1.1. Approaching the nature of specialised languages from
circumstantial communicative conditions
5 Specialised languages have received many definitions over the years. Yet, the ones we
generally come across approach these languages from the circumstantial  conditions
where they are used for communication.  They are characterised by who uses them
(specialists), when they are used (in specialised communication), and why they are used
(to convey specialised information).
6 The two following definitions broadly exemplify these “conditional” approaches. SLs
are  characterised  by  the  “sphere  of  communication”,  “the  subjects”  conveyed,  the
“intentions” of the actors and the “conditions” of use:
Specialised  languages:  a  generic  phrase  describing  languages  used  in
communication  situations  (oral  or  written)  which  imply  the  transmission  of
information that pertains to a particular field of experience. (Galisson & Coste 1976:
511; my translation)
By LSP [Languages for Specific Purposes] we understand a complete set of linguistic
phenomena occurring within a definite sphere of communication and limited by
specific subjects, intentions, and conditions. (Hoffmann 1979: 16)
7 Similarly, the following definitions exemplify characterisation by users and purposes:
Special languages, or more precisely special subject languages, are usually thought
of as the means of expression of highly qualified subject specialists like engineers,
physicians, lawyers, etc. and are often derogatively referred to as ‘jargon’: The fact
that humbler occupations like nursing, book-keeping and cooking and even hobbies
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also involve special areas of human interest and therefore also require and indeed
have their  own special  languages is  much less often acknowledged.  (Sager et  al.
1980: 3)
[specialised  languages]  are  the  basic  instruments  of  communication  among
specialists.  Terminology  is  the  major  aspect  which  differentiates  specialised
languages from the general language but also the different specialised languages.
(Cabré 1998: 90; my translation)
8 A French expert in SLs, Pierre Lerat, also illustrates this circumstantial approach. He
defines an SL as a “natural language regarded as a carrier of specialised knowledge”
(1995:  20);  as  “the use of  a  natural  language to account for  specialised knowledge”
(1995: 20–21); and as “a language in a situation of professional use” (1995: 21; 1997: 1;
my translations).
9 Similarly  ESP  features  this  circumstantial  approach.  In  The  Handbook  of  English  for
Specific  Purposes published  in  2013,  a  work  of  reference  for  the  ESP  community
(hereafter The Handbook), ESP is defined by its conditions of use as “the teaching and
learning of English as a second or foreign language where the goal of the learners is to
use English in a particular domain” (Paltridge & Starfield 2013: 2). Yet, compared with
other approaches, ESP has taken this conditional logic particularly far by developing
sophisticated methods to take circumstantial determinations into account in order to
adapt language learning and teaching as closely as possible to learners’ needs. Indeed,
refined needs analyses detail the conditional requirements of language teaching and
learning and are the building blocks on which language specificity is based.
10 While  I  readily  admit  that  these  definitions  and  approaches  aptly  describe  the
phenomena of SLs when they are put to communicative use, I think that their capacity
to characterise SLs’ core nature as an object of knowledge is not satisfactory from an
epistemological point of view. More explicitly, the “specialised” nature of SLs, i.e. the
central feature by which they differ from general languages, seems to me ill-defined if
its  characterisation only derives from the circumstances where these languages are
used. To clarify this objection, I turn to an Austrian epistemological philosopher, Karl
Popper, and make use of his theory of the three worlds.
 
1.2. Popper’s three worlds and the study of specialised languages
as objective knowledge
11 Karl Popper (1902–1994) developed his theory of the three worlds in various works,
including chapters of Objective Knowledge (1994 [1972]) and his Tanner Lecture, Three
Worlds, delivered at the University of Michigan in 1978. He argues that three different
orders of reality, which he calls “three worlds”, coexist:
[…] the first is the physical world or the world of physical states; the second is the
mental world or the world of mental states; the third is the world of intelligibles or
the world of ideas in the objective sense […]. (1994: 154; Popper’s italics)
12 In  Popper’s  view,  the three worlds  are  largely  autonomous although world 2  stems
from  world 1,  and  world 3  from  world 2.  However,  one  of  the  crucial  differences
between worlds 2 and 3 is that world 2 mental states are attached to people and their
real  life  experience  whereas  world 3  knowledge  is  “exosomatic”  (1994:  120),  i.e.  it
comprises  abstractions  which  exist  outside  people’s  bodies.  Popper  calls  them
“knowledge  without  a  knowing  subject”  or  “objective  knowledge”  or  “objective
thought content” (1994: 109, 111, 156). On the other hand, world 2 knowledge remains
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attached to  people’s  “thought  processes”,  i.e.  to  particular  subjects.  Popper  calls  it
“knowledge in the subjective sense” (1978: 156):
I suggest that we must distinguish between world 2 thought processes and world 3
thought contents. The thought processes are concrete, in the sense that they happen
to certain people on certain occasions;  at  a certain place and at a certain time.
(1978: 160)
13 Popper’s theory helps us to understand the limited relevance of characterising SLs by
the circumstances where they occur. These determinations place them in the second
world of subjective knowledge because they remain attached to their local conditions
of existence. In other words, if an SL only appears when specialists communicate, the
presence of these specialists is a prerequisite for the language to exist; and it fails to
exist when no specialist uses it. The same demonstration applies to the various external
circumstances  that  are  selected  to  characterise  SLs:  sphere  of  communication,
conditions of use, intentions, etc. If they are only defined by their conditions of use, SLs
cannot exist autonomously as world 3 objects of study.
14 This observation emphatically applies to the linguistic knowledge produced by ESP. It is
purposefully aimed at real learners and is designed to meet real needs. It  is clearly
based on concrete world 2 thought processes which develop in certain life contexts.
The increasing sophistication of needs analyses to adjust teaching accurately to the
requirements of learners only roots the resulting knowledge deeper into world 2 and
further  from world 3.  Indeed,  the more specific  the needs,  the more particular  the
answers and the more subjective the knowledge. Although English for engineering or
accounting clearly serve engineering and accounting “specialities”, the very choice of
“specific”  instead  of  “specialised”  in  the  name  “English  for  ‘Specific’  Purposes”
deliberately  anchors  the  resulting  knowledge  in  world 2  and  precludes  the
development of world 3 knowledge in SLs.
15 I readily admit that, as a consequence of this conditional approach, ESP has produced
an impressive amount of valuable second world teaching knowledge to meet learners’
needs: for example in English for business, medical or legal purposes. However, this
need-driven knowledge has not been consolidated nor generalised along more abstract
notional lines to produce world 3 knowledge that could be accumulated and passed on
to future teachers and scholars. As far as I know, there are no methodical descriptions
of  legal  or  medical  English  available  for  study  by  would-be  practitioners  and
researchers.  As  recently  as  2013,  Diane  Belcher  recognised  in  The Handbook that
knowledge building and transmission for ESP teachers remain inadequate:
What  we  do  know about  the  education  of  those  interested  in  specific-purpose-
driven teaching is that there is little preparatory course-work available. Very few
programs in  Teaching  English  to  Speakers  of  Other  Languages  (TESOL),  applied
linguistics,  or  language education offer  ESP as  an area of  specialization,  though
relatively  more  provide  elective  classes  in  the  ESP approach.  Given the  limited
formal ESP pre-service options, it is no surprise that ESP professional education has
not been a popular research topic [...]. (2013: 544)
16 In a strikingly prescient way, John Swales provided a similar critical analysis of ESP’s
conditional  and  local  short-termism  in  a  1983  plenary  lecture.  Remarkably,  he
developed a logic akin to Popper’s worlds 2 and 3:
Yet, despite 20 years’ work in ESP and despite the large number of descriptions and
discussions of its theory and practice, ESP practitioners in my experience tend to
ignore the past. [They] are concerned with the ‘here and now’ of their own working
situation; in general, they do not look across to see what other people in similar
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situations are doing and they do not look back to see what people in their own or
other situations have done. […] By locking ourselves into the ‘here and now’ there
are lessons that are not learnt, there are insights that are not gained and there are
short  cuts  that  are  not  made.  […]  At  this  point,  it  may  be  objected  that  such
historical  information  is  of  little  value  to  the  hard-pressed  ESP  practitioner.
However, I would answer this objection by suggesting that background knowledge
is  useful,  perhaps  even  necessary,  if  we  are  to  distinguish  local solutions  from
general conceptual developments […]. (1983: 2–3: Swales’s italics)
17 It is clear that the notions of ‘here and now’ and ‘local solutions’ point to a Popperian-
like second world while his “general conceptual developments” hint at some world 3 of
a more objective type of knowledge. The passage “there are lessons that are not learnt,
there are insights that are not gained and there are short cuts that are not made”
means, as I see it, that tailoring language teaching to ever more specific needs makes it
hard to generalise and consolidate teaching experience, and that this approach leads to
knowledge fragmentation and hampers conceptual knowledge building. Diane Belcher’s
2013 remark shows that Swales’s concerns largely remain valid today.
18 The lack of accumulation and transmission of objective knowledge in ESP should be a
cause of worry for the academic community because it does not fit properly with what
is generally understood by scientific progress: scientists share results which can then
be transmitted to new generations to be criticised and improved over the years. The
issue is also a problem in the many countries that suffer from a shortage of qualified
ESP teachers and scholars. Teaching the learners fully justifies world 2 approaches to
SLs; on the other hand, teaching the teachers and scholars justifies a world 3 approach.
19 If  objective  knowledge  in  specialised  languages  cannot  be  adequately  built  on  the
circumstances  surrounding  specialisation,  it  follows  that  it  has  to  be  built  on  its
essence, i.e. specialisation described as a world 3 Popperian object, independently from
local circumstances. This is what I tentatively propose to do in the following section.
 
2. Describing specialisation as objective knowledge
2.1. Specialisation as a form of philosophical intentionality
20 The  concept  of  specialisation  has  already  been  addressed  by  disciplines  such  as
economics (firms specialise in their activities to be more competitive) and adaptive
zoology (species specialise to adapt and survive), but more rarely as the general and
human  philosophical  notion  we  need  to  clarify  in  order  to  make  sense  of  SLs.  I
hypothesise  that  human  specialisation  is  a  mental state  that  entails  some  type  of
relationship between the human mind and the world. Further, I suggest that the nature
of  this  relationship is  best  approached as  a  specific  form of  “intentionality” in the
philosophical sense of the word – distinct from ordinary intentions as in “I intend to
apply for a scholarship this year”.
21 Philosophical intentionality has been extensively studied by John R. Searle (1983, 2004)
who defines it as “that capacity of the mind by which mental states refer to, or are
about, or are of objects and states of affairs in the world other than themselves”, as for
example when I think of the sun or that Caesar crossed the Rubicon (2004: 19, 112; see
also 1983:  1).  He calls  it  “the directedness or aboutness of  the mind” (2004:  3)  and
underlines that intentionality always comes with an aspectual shape. In other words,
“intentional states, like beliefs and desires, represent the world under some aspects
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and not others” (2004: 65, 117). For example, some person may refer to a liquid we
drink as “water” while another may refer to the same thing as “H2O”.
22 As a rule,  intentional  states are rather fleeting mental  dispositions,  but if  a  person
selects  one  object  for  focused  and  durable  reference  under  the  same  particular
aspectual shape, this disposition may be called a “specialised” type of intentionality
because the mind forms a selective,  concentrated and durable “directedness” when
referring  to  a  particular  object  in  the  world.  Searle  writes  that  “intending,  in  the
ordinary  sense  in  which  I  intend  to  go  to  the  movies  tonight,  is  just  one  kind  of
intentionality among others along with belief, hope, fear, desire and perception” (2004:
19). Similarly, I suggest that specialisation also is one such kind of intentionality.
23 Searle  then  explains  that  intentional  states  relate  to  the  world  in  different  ways,
generally under the forms of beliefs or desires. If a person believes that an object is as it
is,  he  develops  a  mental  state  which  fits  or  does  not  fit  the  world,  depending  on
whether his belief is right or wrong. Searle calls it a “mind-to-world direction of fit”
because the mind tries to adapt to the reality of the world. On the other hand, he calls a
desire  “a world-to-mind direction of  fit”  since the mind aims at  making the world
match the content of the intentional state (1983: 8; 2004: 118). He also identifies a “null
direction of fit” when no belief or desire is expressed (as when I am sorry that I stepped
on your foot or when I am glad that the sun is shining) because a fitting relation is
presupposed instead of believed or desired.  The difference between the two former
directions  of  fit  and  the  null  one  is  that  the  former  contain  their  conditions  of
satisfaction: the belief is satisfied or succeeds if it is true, it fails if it is false; the desire
is fulfilled if it gets reality to match the intentional state, or dissatisfied if not. Null
directions of fit, on the other hand, have no conditions of satisfaction because no belief
or desire is expressed (2004: 118–119).
24 From these considerations, we can derive the idea that “specialised intentionality” is a
durable form of intentional state where focusing on one particular object under one
single  aspect  is  motivated  by  specific  beliefs  and  desires  and  their  conditions  of
satisfaction. The mind concentrates on the object because it develops about it cognitive
and volitive mental states which aim at being satisfied. Conversely, null directions of fit
seem to be alien to the specialisation process since no aim at knowing the object and no
desire to act on it is expressed. Hence, it appears that cognitive and volitive mental
states form the “purpose” of specialised intentionality which is either to know more
about the object or to make it match our desires. As I see it, these two processes, (1)
focusing  durably  on  one  object  under  one  aspectual  shape  and  (2)  developing  a
cognitive  and/or  volitive  purpose  about  it,  describe  the  elementary  and  structural
components of specialisation independently from local circumstances.
25 Searle complements his description of intentionality by writing that “intentional states
do not  in general  come in isolated units”,  they come attached to other intentional
states:
If  I  believe,  for  example,  that  it  is  raining,  I  cannot  just  have  that  feeling  in
isolation. I must believe for example that rain consists of drops of water, that these
fall out of the sky, that they generally go down not up, that they make the ground
wet, [...] and so on more or less indefinitely. [...] [I]n general it seems that the belief
that it is raining is only the belief that it is because of its position in a network of
beliefs and other intentional states. (2004: 121; Searle’s italics)
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26 Furthermore,  intentional  states  also  presuppose  certain  capacities  which  are  not
intentional states themselves, but which are necessary for intentionality to exist at all.
Searle calls them “the Background” (1983: 141–159):
If you follow out the threads of the network, you eventually reach a set of abilities,
ways  of  coping  with  the  world,  dispositions  and  capacities  generally  that  I
collectively  call  the  “Background”.  [...]  I  hold  the  controversial  thesis  that
intentional states in general require a background of non-intentional capacities in
order to function at all. (2004: 121)
27 The following sections will show how specialised intentional states similarly require
networks of intentionality and background abilities to function.
 
2.2. From individual to collective specialised intentionality
28 Intentionality, as presented by Searle, describes the mental state of individual minds,
and we can indeed observe that individual persons develop specific forms of specialised
intentionality when they “specialise” in some form of durable activity, passion, hobby
or interest. Yet, the minds of such individual specialists rarely develop SLs and we are
principally  interested  in  “collective”  forms  of  specialisation  from  which  SLs  may
emerge.
29 When many minds share an identical type of specialised intentionality and all durably
focus  on  the  same  object  under  the  same  aspect,  a  collective  form  of  specialised
intentionality  develops.  History  provides  noteworthy  instances  of  transitions  from
individual  to  collective  intentionalities  when  pioneering  individual  intentionalities
turn  into  collective  ones  after  being  adopted  by  many  followers.  For  example,  the
intense private interests of Carl von Linné for plants and of Frederick W. Taylor for
worker effectiveness can be seen as individual specialised intentionalities that came to
be shared by many and evolved into collective ones (and eventually into specialised
fields in their own right, respectively modern botany and scientific management).
30 If we now pause to relate these advances to Popper’s theory of the three worlds, it
appears that specialised intentionalities, whether individual or collective, belong in his
second world of subjective mental states because they stem from the real minds of real
people.  In  that  respect  however,  an  interesting  refinement  to  Popper’s  theory  is
proposed by Geoffrey Leech and it may help us to gain in analytical accuracy. While
admitting much in Popper’s approach, Leech suggests that Popper’s world 2 should be
broken into two distinct worlds, namely a world of mental individual subjective objects
or states (which becomes world 2) and a world of societal objects and states (world 3; my
italics), thus making of Popper’s world 3 a fourth world (Leech 1983: 51–56). Leech’s
argument is that “the missing link, in Popper’s evolutionary epistemology, is a world of
societal facts (or what Searle had called ‘institutional facts’) intervening between the
second (subjective) and his third (objective) worlds” (1983: 51). Leech goes on justifying
this new world 3:
This is no longer a subjective world, but rather an intersubjective one, for as the
triangulation performed by more than one observer can establish the location of
some observed object, so a number of individuals from the same social group can
mutually confirm the meaning of  some phenomenon which is  external  to all  of
them. (1983: 51; Leech’s italics)
31 Using  Leech’s  framework,  we  may  infer  that  individual  specialised  intentionalities
belong  in  the  second  world  of  individual  subjective  states  and  that  collective
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intersubjective ones belong in world 3. Leech’s valuable distinction paves the way for
the idea that collective forms of specialised intentionalities may morph into specialised
social groups.
 
2.3. From collective specialised intentionalities to specialised
domains via specialised communities
32 Popper (1994 [1972]: 119–120) and Leech (1983: 48–56) show how language plays a major
role in the constitution of the different worlds they identify. Popper explains that the
expressive  and  signalling  functions  of  language  contribute  to  the  development  of
subjective knowledge. To this, Leech adds that intersubjective communication confirms
the meaning of  phenomena within social  groups and accounts for the formation of
institutions:
On  the  basis  of  such  confirmed  communicative  values,  there  may  arise  social
institutions  such as  ownership,  marriage,  rights,  obligations:  these  ‘institutional
facts’  could  not  exist  outside  a  world  in  which  the  signalling  function  of
communication has established a reality beyond the individual. The intersubjective
world of social facts in turn becomes the prerequisite of the descriptive function of
language. Concepts of reference, truth, and falsity could not exist outside a social
world in which individuals  can share and compare their  descriptions of  reality.
(1983: 51)
33 Similarly,  I  suggest  that  language  contributes  to  the  development  of  social
specialisation. Its expressive and signalling functions enable individuals to share with
others  their  singular  intentional  states,  their  related  interacting  networks  of
intentional  states  and  their  background  abilities  (as  detailed  in  section  2.1).
Interpersonal  communication  then  helps  these  persons  to  combine  their  related
interests  into  collective  forms  of  specialisation.  For  example,  an  intentional  state
focusing  on  “sick  people”  develops  in  an  interacting  network  of  other  intentional
states.  These  may  contain  the  beliefs  that  sick  people  have  bodies  (and  skeletons,
brains, muscles, nerves, breathing, digestive and reproductive organs...) and that they
suffer from injuries (and germs, poisonous plants, cold weather...). These states may
also contain the desires to cure (and relieve, comfort, find treatment...). Additionally,
many background abilities combine to contribute to the satisfaction of these beliefs and
desires: abilities to observe, diagnose, operate, advise; together with, for instance, the
abilities  to  communicate  with  colleagues  and  to  write...  These  interrelated  and
complementary intentionalities and abilities are distributed among the members of the
group depending on their personal inclinations and capacities. They converge on the
satisfaction of one common purpose – e.g. cure sick people or preserve health – and
form both a complex and homogeneous specialised community of doctors, surgeons,
pharmacists,  anatomists,  etc.  The resulting social  institution is  what  we may call  a
medical community. 
34 The same demonstration may be proposed for other fields such as law, engineering,
banking,  from  which  similar  specialised  communities  may  emerge...  When  the
predominant intentional state is a mind-to-world direction of fit, the cognitive purpose
of specialisation aims at the development of knowledge and produces disciplinary or
scientific communities. When world-to-mind directions of fit dominate, volition-driven
specialised action and practice prevail and form professional communities. As a rule,
specialisation processes  combine beliefs  and desires  in  varied proportions:  medical,
A proposal to establish epistemological foundations for the study of speciali...
ASp, 69 | 2016
8
legal or banking specialists all  need a mix of knowledge and practice to satisfy the
purpose  of  their  specialisation.  As  Michel  Petit  explains  in  detail,  these  specialised
groups organise the way they operate. Particularly, they regulate their activities and
the way they train new entrants in the group (2010: 10).
35 However,  specialised  communities  will  produce  subjective  knowledge  as  long  as  it
remains attached to the mental representations of their members. They will generate
objective  knowledge  solely  when  they  produce  linguistic  propositions  which  are
“exosomatic” to them (Popper 1994: 120), i.e. independent from their members’ bodies
and  minds.  Although  objective  knowledge  stems  from  mental  intentional  states,  it
becomes  autonomous  from  them  thanks  to  the  higher  functions  of  language  –
description and argumentation (Popper 1994: 119) – and can thus form fully-fledged
specialised domains.  In specialised domains,  the beliefs and desires of singular men
turn into abstract purposes which transcend the specialised communities determined
by  time  and  space  that have  generated  them.  The  final  purpose  of  the  specialised
domain of medicine is to cure sick men and preserve health, whether in ancient Greece,
traditional China, Renaissance Europe or modern America.
36 That is the reason why I do not follow Petit’s definition of specialised domains:
[...] we shall call specialised domain any sector of society built around and with the
aim of exercising one main activity which, by its nature, its purpose and its specific
modalities,  together  with  the  specific  competences  it  puts  into  play  among  its
actors, defines the recognisable place of this sector within society and among a set
of other sectors, and determines its specific composition and organisation. (2010: 9;
my translation)
37 While I  accept much in this  definition,  I  take issue with its  major proposition that
specialised  domains  are  “sectors  of  society”.  As  far  as  I  can  see,  Petit  describes
“specialised communities” and not “specialised domains”. Leech’s theory of the four
worlds indicates that specialised domains (world 4) cannot be social actors (world 3)
because their knowledge would be inseparable from them and so remain subjective.
Indeed,  considering that  a  domain is  made of  people  would be a  throwback to  the
medieval trade corporations where knowledge was transmitted by word of mouth down
from masters to companions and apprentices.  At that time, “domains” were indeed
social  because  they  were  inseparable  from  those  who  mastered  them.  Scientific
advances in the 17th century and the great encyclopaedias of the 18th century put paid
to this “knowledge with knowing subjects” by carrying out mass transfers of subjective
knowledge to the objective world,  thus paving the way for the development of  our
modern specialised domains.
38 Similarly, I posit that a domain is not primarily characterised by “one main activity”,
but by its purpose. Purposes are the original raison d’être of specialised domains because
cognitive and volitive specialised intentional states determine activities and not the
other way around. Activities are largely subject to time and space determinations and
remain attached to persons while purposes transcend local situations and are better
suited to the establishment of objective knowledge. Specialised domains are not social
in nature, they are sets of knowledge and/or practices which have become independent
from their originators and are harnessed to the service of one particular purpose or set
of purposes.
39 Specialised domains represent the highest stage of the specialisation process where the
higher  functions  of  language,  description  and  argumentation,  contribute  to  the
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emergence of the idea of truth which is a description that fits the facts and which may
be criticised (Popper 1994: 120). In that respect, the invention of writing has proven
decisive  to  develop  the  argumentative  function  of  language  and  to  create  world 4
(Leech) or world 3 (Popper) objects:
[I]t  is  perhaps  not  unreasonable  to  suppose  that  the  argumentative  function of
language could not have developed its full potential until the invention of writing.
Without the means to record linguistic messages, so that addressers and addresses
can be widely separated in time and space, it is difficult to conceive of the existence
of  ‘objective  knowledge’  in  Popper’s  sense,  i.e. knowledge  which  exists
independently  of  any  knower.  Popper’s  examples  of  such  knowledge  (e.g.
mathematical knowledge, knowledge stored in libraries, scientific knowledge) all
presuppose a written medium. (Leech 1983: 53)
40 A  specialised  domain  is  therefore  the  autonomous  linguistic  and  generally  written
expression  of  a  complex  intentional  universe.  It  is  made  of  focused  and  durable
intentional  states,  their  related  intentional  networks  and  background  abilities  that
combine and interact to satisfy their beliefs and desires. To shorten the definition, I
propose that specialised domains are sets of knowledge and practice which transcend
their originators and are harnessed to the service of one particular purpose.
 
3. From specialised domains to specialised languages
3.1. Subjecting communication to purpose
41 Among the background abilities that enable specialised domains to function, we find
the capacity to create and use semiotic systems to convey meaning among specialised
communities.  They  express  the  domain  in  signs  in  order  to  serve  its  purpose.  For
example, such systems include symbols (the asklepian is the symbol of medicine, a pair
of  scales  represents  the  law,  anchors  indicate  navies,  wings  air  forces...)  and
professional attire (military uniforms, legal and academic attire...).
42 Yet,  the most  sophisticated of  these semiotic  systems is  language and it  specialises
when it loads itself with the specialised intentional states of the domain. An SL is an
“intentionalised” form of a natural language that puts its communicative function at
the  service  of  the  purpose  of  the  domain  among  specialised  communities.  In  that
respect, most scholars in the field think that the foremost function of languages for
specific purposes is to enable communication. They share Ken Hyland’s view that “ESP
itself steadfastly concerns itself with communication” (Hyland 2013: 96). As I see it, SLs
have no purely communicative functions. They are background abilities that subject
communication to the purposes of  the domains.  Engineers communicate when they
discuss the weather, but when they work to contribute to the conditions of satisfaction
of  engineering  beliefs  and  desires,  they  use  English  for  engineering.  Specialised
languages  need  not  be  highly  technical  or  abstruse  to  qualify  as  such,  the  major
criterion is that their communicative capacities are not deployed for communication’s
sake,  but are harnessed to the service of  the purpose of  the domain.  Searle clearly
explains that the intentionality of the mind cannot be explained by the intentionality
of language:
Language  is  derived  from  Intentionality  and  not  conversely.  The  direction  of
pedagogy is to explain Intentionality in terms of language; the direction of logical
analysis is to explain language in terms of Intentionality. (1983: 5)
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The intentionality of language has to be explained in terms of the intentionality of
the mind and not conversely. [...] The meaning of language is derived intentionality
and it has to be derived from the original intentionality of the mind. (2004: 113)
43 This is emphatically the case for specialised languages and, for instance, the “discourse
communities”  carefully  described  by  Swales  (1990:  21–29)  are  indeed  discourse
communities because they are specialised communities in the first place. They have to
share a collective set of intentionalities and their conditions of satisfaction to develop a
common  discourse.  Swales  presumably  implies  as  much  since  his  first  criterion  to
characterise a discourse community is “a broadly agreed set of common public goals”
(1990:  24;  my  italics);  the  communicative  criterion  (“mechanisms  of
intercommunication among its members”) only takes second place (1990: 25). I fully
agree with him when he specifies:
It is commonality of the goal, not shared objects of study that is criterial, even if the
former often subsumes the latter. But not always. The fact that the shared object of
study is, say, the Vatican, does not imply that students of the Vatican in history
departments, the Kremlin, dioceses, birth control agencies and liberation theology
seminars form a discourse community. (1990: 25)
44 The purpose served by the specialised community is of course a major determining
factor, but Swales underplays the criterial importance of objects of study because he
does not take into account the “aspectual shape” of the object, and that intentionality
first  requires  an  object  to  develop  beliefs  and  desires.  So,  if  a community  first
specialises in a shared object of study under the same aspectual shape, it is highly likely that
it will share a common purpose (or goal or objective) and that it will form a discourse
community.  For  example,  if  Kremlin  specialists,  historians  and  liberation  theory
seminars  all  decide  to  study  the  Vatican  under  the  aspectual  shape  of  a  historical
phenomenon, they will presumably share the same beliefs and desires about it and are
likely to form a discourse community, even if the practical probabilities of them ever
working together are scant. In the last analysis, the fact that communication is subject
to  specialised  purpose  in  SLs  provides  the  rationale  for  founding  the  domain  on
specialisation and not on language. If indeed, “the philosophy of language is a branch
of the philosophy of the mind” (Searle 1983: vii), the epistemological foundations of SLs
are to be found in intentionality rather than in communication.
 
3.2. The social dimension of specialised languages
45 Studying SLs implies studying the relationships they establish between Leech’s world 4
objects  (specialised  domains)  and  world 3  ones  (specialised  communities).  Because
specialised communities are composed of the “bodies” of their members (Popper 1994:
120),  they  are  subject  to  the  physical  determinations  of  world 1.  Among  these
determinations are space and time. Thus, the geographical distribution of languages
generates linguistic specialised communities (e.g. English-speaking lawyers who use a
specialised variety of English [SVE], legal English). Moreover, the political structuration
of  human space generates  national  specialised communities  (i.e.  Canadian lawyers).
These  two  space  factors  rarely  frame the  same territories  and  national  specialised
communities may comprise two or more linguistic communities (Canadian lawyers may
speak English or French). Conversely, linguistic specialised communities may comprise
several  national  ones  (English-speaking  lawyers  may  be British  [including  the  sub-
groups of English and Scottish lawyers], American, Australian, etc.).
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46 These distinctions matter because languages and nations have cultural idiosyncrasies
which  may  shape  intentional  states  and  the  resulting  specialised  domains.  Certain
domains develop background abilities to avoid these cultural influences because, for
example,  their  purpose  aims at  building culture-proof  universal  knowledge.  This  is
generally  the  case  for  hard  sciences  that  have  generalised  the  use  of  formalised
languages  such  as  mathematics  so  that  their  various  linguistic  and  national
communities may communicate without cultural distortions in meaning. On the other
hand, some domains are highly culture-sensitive. A case in point is English common law
which only develops in English-speaking countries and within the English language. In
that  respect,  a  general  theorem  may  be  proposed  that  the  culture  sensitivity  of  a
domain and of its  related language is  inversely proportional to its  universality.  For
example, serving the purpose of a highly mathematical domain such as nuclear physics
is  theoretically  insensitive  to  the  language  or  the  nationality  of  its  specialised
communities. Conversely, a domain such as accounting remains fairly culture-sensitive
as  outlooks  and  practices  may  differ  widely  among  national  communities,  with
significant  influences  on  language.  The  feedback  cultural  influence  of  specialised
domains and languages on countries is also of interest in SL studies. Some domains
have deeply influenced certain nations’ cultures and civilisations and have made their
idiom the language of choice to approach the domain. For example, musicians have
long enriched the cultural  identity  of  Italy  and have given the Italian language its
prominence in the domain.
47 As far as the temporal determination is concerned, it implies that SLs, as all human
phenomena, have a historical dimension. In that respect, the main drawback of needs
analysis  in  ESP  is  that  learners’  needs  are  generally  today’s  needs;  sometimes
tomorrow’s, but never yesterday’s. Thus, while ESP has a history of its own, the needs-
analysis  paradigm  generally  opens  up  to  synchronicity.  Yet,  common  experience
indicates that SLs have a life of their own, that some appear as mature (e.g. medical
English,  legal  English)  while  others  seem  younger  (e.g.  IT  English)  and  that  many
emerge every year. As a rule, most SLs start as (Leech’s) world 3 objects because they
are simply the way members of a community communicate with each other in habitual
specialised conversation. At that stage, members are generally more concerned with
the  final  purpose  of  the  domain  than  with  its  expression  in  language,  and  their
awareness that a specialised language exists may take decades or centuries. Yet, there
comes a time when some languages specialise out of general conversation and the need
for  specialised  word-books,  glossaries  and  dictionaries  appears.  In  itself,  this
dictionarisation process does not produce an SL, but it is one of the clear signs that one
is in the making. Specialised dictionaries play a crucial role in transferring SLs from
world 3  to  world 4.  Specialised  words  and  expressions  leave  world 3  of  personal
interchange  and  access  the  world 4  status  of  objective  knowledge.  Thanks  to  a
specialised  dictionary,  a  complete  outsider  may  start  to  learn  the  language  of  a
specialised community on his own, however exclusive it may be. Objectors may argue
that specialised lexis is only a small part of SVEs. This is a fair point, but we must bear
in mind that, beyond their singular meaning, specialised words also convey a lot about
the directness of the domain, its intentionality, its objects and their aspectual shapes
and its related background abilities. Studies in the diachronic dimension of SLs and in
the historical developments of specialised dictionaries are still rare (Charpy 2011: 25–
42), but they should be encouraged as part of a methodical study of SLs.
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3.3. The functional dimension of specialised languages
3.3.1. The pragmatic analysis of specialised functionality
48 Because specialised languages serve the purposes of domains, they are functional in
essence.
What  is  meant  by  a  functional  explanation?  It  means  explaining  why  a  given
phenomenon occurs,  by  showing  what  its  contribution  is  to  a  larger  system of
which it is itself a sub-system. As far as language is concerned, a functional theory
is  one  which  defines  language  as  a  form  of  communication,  and  therefore  is
concerned with showing how language works within the larger systems of human
society. Talk of purpose, ends goals, plans also presupposes functionalism. (Leech
1983: 48)
49 Leech’s explanation neatly accounts for the case of SLs. Yet, it is applied to general
language and an enduring question in the field bears on the difference between general
language and specialised languages.  Catherine Resche wonders  about  the “frontiers
between general and specialised language” and asks “at what point can we say that a
language is specialised and what criteria can we use?” (2001: 37; my translation). I try
to address the issue by resorting to an example. Suppose sentence [1]:
[1] There are many bears in New York and London zoos; but in 2007-08 the most
dangerous bears were in Wall Street and in the City.
50 The casual reader basically understands what the sentence says, but remains unsure as
to what it means, especially in the passage following “but in 2007-08”: bears in zoos are
familiar but not in financial centres. Nothing in the grammar of the sentence hints at
specialisation  and  general  semantics  does  not  really  help.  We  find  ourselves  in  a
situation where the conceptual arsenal of pragmatics is of great help (see Leech 1983:
35–45,  13–14,  176).  Interpretation  here  presumably  involves  the  “context  of  the
utterance” and takes the form of a “problem-solving” exercise. The addressee’s task is
to understand the “goal of the utterance”, i.e. the meaning intended by the addresser.
The interpretation process takes a “heuristic form” in that the addressee must use a
trial-and-error method to form hypotheses and check them against available evidence.
Eventually,  among likely  hypotheses,  one will  tentatively  connect  “bear”  with Wall
Street and the City, and scrutinising the “specialised” entry for bear in an advanced
reader’s dictionary will reveal that it is a pessimistic investor who expects to speculate
on falling prices (“Compare bull”). This decoding key will be found fairly “felicitous” as
it introduces some consistency in meaning.
51 The correct interpretation of this single word is enough to tip the utterance over from
general to specialised language. It summons the whole intentional universe of stock
market finance which intervenes as an overall “presupposition” (Grice 1991: 269–282)
which pre-determines interpretation. In general English, Wall Street and the City could
be places of tourist interest just like the zoos mentioned in the passage. Here, they
definitely represent the specialised communities where “bear” makes sense and they
confirm that the talk-exchange is taking place in the specialised domain of the stock
market. In order to understand the utterance, the addressee must cooperate with the
addresser, i.e. resort to the “cooperative principle” (Grice ibid.: 28–31; Leech ibid.: 79).
Here, cooperating means accepting the specialised domain of stock market finance as
the relevant “context of the utterance”. In doing so, the addressee has access to the
“purpose” of the utterance or what is called the “illocutionary point” in pragmatics
A proposal to establish epistemological foundations for the study of speciali...
ASp, 69 | 2016
13
(Searle & Vanderveken 1985: 13–15). This illocutionary point conveys the beliefs and/or
desires of the addresser within the domain’s intentional universe, which means that it
stems from the purpose of the domain and is itself specialised.
 
3.3.2. Introducing the notion of specialised implicature
52 At that stage, the addressee is able to form a broadly satisfactory interpretation of the
utterance,  but  why financial  “bears”  can  happen to be  more  dangerous  than their
plantigrade  namesakes  remains  unclear.  Further  trial-and-error  research  in  the
“context  of  the utterance” (i.e.  the domain,  the specialised community,  the related
background abilities together with space and time factors) reveals that “bears” often
resort  to  short-selling  techniques  to  make  money  on  falling  prices  and  that  these
speculative methods have repeatedly been perceived as  dangerous by stock market
authorities  and often banned as a  result.  The fact  that financial  “bears” may be as
dangerous as wild beasts is therefore “implied” in the utterance and may be analysed as
a  specialised  form  of  “conventional  implicature”  (i.e.  directly  derived  from  the
meaning of the words as opposed to “conversational implicature”; see Grice ibid.: 25–26
and Leech ibid.: 11). Specialised implicature is common in SLs and can be analysed in
pragmatic terms.
 
3.3.3. Introducing the notion of specialised encyclopaedia
53 A  final  question  has  to  be  addressed:  why  were  bears  particularly  dangerous  in
2007-08?  Further  contextual  trial-and-error  research  identifies  these  years  as  the
climax of  the subprime crisis  when short-selling bears made fortunes on the death
throes  of  prominent  investment  banks  and  precipitated  their  downfall  (e.g.  Bear
Stearns  in  2007  and  Lehman  Brothers  in  2008).  So  much  so  that  short-selling  was
regarded as a serious threat to the survival of the financial markets by the American
and British authorities and was temporarily banned at the time. The analytical outcome
is that an apparently unspecialised sentence yields a highly-specialised meaning and
requires a highly-specialised interpretation. If the addressee fails to cooperate with the
addresser,  his  likely  answer  will  remain  general,  puzzled  and  external  to  the
intentional universe of the domain; something like [2]:
[2] Really? I did not know there were bears in Wall Street and in the City.
54 Conversely, if he can cooperate, his answer will probably be highly specialised as in [3]:
[3] Quite so. John Paulson and his friends nearly finished western market finance at
the time.
55 Answer [3] bears little apparent connection with the addresser’s surface formulation in
[1].  While  [2]  is  a  reply  to  what  [1]  says,  [3]  is  a  reply  to  its  pure  meaning,  the
specialised illocutionary force of the utterance. Now, [3] suggests that the felicitous
interpretation of [1] implies some prior knowledge that the addressee shares with the
addresser. Vijay K. Bathia insists on the role played by prior knowledge that enables
insiders to understand specialised messages. He calls it “specific disciplinary cultures”,
“prior knowledge of disciplinary or institutional conventions”, “existing knowledge” or
“pre-knowledge”  (2004:  186–188).  Here,  prior  knowledge  is  both  linguistic  –  it
successfully  uses  the  language  game  “bear  (animal)/bear  (speculator)”  –  and
extralinguistic – it is able to connect the language game to an aspect of the specialised
domain  and  to  history.  Referential  connections  of  this  type  are  unpredictable  and
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potentially infinite. Language actors cooperate successfully when they can adapt their
prior knowledge to the countless contextual requirements of interpretation. I suggest
that  the  competence  to  make  successful  interpretive  use  of  such  connections  is
“encyclopaedic” in nature as it may draw from an infinite amount of knowledge.
56 I borrow the notion of “encyclopaedia” from Umberto Eco (1986: 68–86) and from Jean-
Jacques Lecercle (1990: 140; 1999: 202–204, 211) and I suggest it might be adapted to
specialised domains. Eco contrasts dictionaries, which merely apply semantic labels to
words, with encyclopaedic knowledge which is required every time a given text is to be
interpreted. In the interpretive process, encyclopaedic knowledge operates as a set of
instructions  that  properly  insert  textual  elements  in  their  relevant  contexts  and
achieve  the  correct  disambiguation  of  terms  (1986:  68).  It  feeds  on  structured
knowledge  and  culture  but  is  different  from  both.  It  represents  the  infinite
potentialities of interpretive processes that can relate any element to any other in any
imaginable order. 
57 In 1990 and 1999,  a  French literature and linguistics  scholar,  Jean-Jacques Lecercle,
revisited  Eco’s  concept  of  encyclopaedia  to  adapt  it  more  closely  to  literary
interpretation.  Yet  his  elaborations  fittingly  accommodate  specialised  domains.  For
Lecercle,  encyclopaedias  “provide  contextual  meaning  and  deal  with  pragmatic
interpretation” (1990: 140). They are linked to sets of contexts, that is, to cultures, and
to sets of beliefs and knowledge held by speech communities or social (religious, ethnic,
professional...) subparts of them. They provide “the link between the abstract system of
language and the extralinguistic, not so much ‘the world’ itself as the lived and partly
structured world of a culture”. They offer a capacity to understand historical hints and
allusions. They are naturally diachronic and use figures of speech like metaphors and
language games (1999: 202–204, 211). 
58 Following Eco and Lecercle, I propose that the “pre-knowledge” required to interpret
coded specialised discourse is similarly encyclopaedic and that specialised domains and
languages contain specialised encyclopaedias that facilitate interpretations.
 
3.4. Concluding on the difference between general and specialised
language
59 The likely answer to Catherine Resche’s question is that the difference between general
and  specialised  language  lies  in  the  intentional  universe  that  is  conveyed  by  the
discourse.  Once  the  intentionality  and  its  purpose  are  specialised,  the  language
expresses the related domain and serves its purpose. In [1], one single word (“bear”)
expresses financial specialisation, but it is enough to contaminate the whole utterance
and harness its illocutionary force to serve the purpose of the domain. It follows that
the  frontiers  between  general  and  specialised  language  are  mostly  porous.  Since
specialisation does not automatically result from the complexity or abstruseness of the
language surface, nor from the quantity of the technical words used in the discourse,
the same utterance may accommodate an infinity of specialised domains or, indeed,
specialised  and  non-specialised  language.  The  only  condition  is  that  context-shift
indicators facilitate the passage from one context to the next to eliminate the opacity
resulting from the multiplicity  of  competing intentionalities  and purposes.  Stephen
Levinson explains how “presupposition triggers” function in conversation (1983: 181–
185) and I suggest that “specialised presupposition triggers” operate in the same way in
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specialised  discourse.  The  final  analytical  say  on  these  language  frontiers  lies  in
pragmatic  rather  than  grammatical  linguistics  because  pragmatics  relates  the
functional  mission  of  the  language  to  the  social  environment  where  it  is  used.  In
Leech’s words:
If we now return to the distinction [...] made between grammar and pragmatics, it
can be seen that the grammar is a ‘World 4’ phenomenon and that linguistics is
unique, among scientific disciplines, in that it aims to provide World 4 explanations of
World 4  phenomena.  [...]  Pragmatics  on  the  other  hand,  deals  with  the  relations
between language as a World 4 phenomenon, and language as a World 3 (social)
phenomenon.  Grammar,  studying  language  as  a  thing  in  itself,  provides  formal
explanations. Pragmatics, studying language in relation to society as a whole, aims
at a functional perspective. (1983: 55–56; Leech’s italics)
 
4. Discussion
60 Discussing the epistemological foundations of SLs and this particular approach could
prove to be an infinite subject.  I  shall  limit  the scope of  this  section to addressing
briefly three issues, one general and two specific.
 
4.1. On the debatable use of this paper
61 I suspect most readers will be disconcerted by this paper and will wonder about its use
in improving the way we teach SLs. While I understand their qualms, I believe that
meeting the needs of learners without meeting those of teachers and scholars leaves
the job half-done and that building some objective knowledge about SLs will sooner or
later come to be seen as indispensable. When other scholars finally decide to grapple
with the issue, they will probably have to find some organising principle in the field of
knowledge under construction and they will face the same problems as I have. My own
proposition  is  that  combining  epistemology,  the  philosophy  of  intentionality  and
pragmatics offers interesting insights on how to build foundations for the study of SLs.
While I am ready to admit that my approach may be misconceived, I encourage authors
to come up with alternative theories to debate and progress.
 
4.2. How much specialised knowledge are SL teachers supposed to
know?
62 The issue of the quantity and quality of specialised knowledge that SL teachers have to
master  has  long  been  debated  in  the  field.  Teachers  have  to  position  their  own
knowledge input in relation to the knowledge of the domain and many are loath to step
on  the  turf  of  specialists  and  pretend  to  master  their  knowledge.  In  2004,  Bhatia
remarked  that  “ESP  practitioners  still  get  nervous  about  having  to  deal  with
disciplinary knowledge as part of  linguistic  training” (ibid.:  204)  and,  as recently as
2013, The Handbook recalled that “[o]ne of the most vexing issues for ESP praxis is the
need for at least some specialist knowledge” (Belcher 2013: 545).
63 My answer is that SL teachers are not concerned with the specialised competences of
the domain,  but  with the expression of  the specialised domain in the language.  By
specialised  competences  I  mean  the  set  of  knowledge  and/or  know-how  directly
involved  in  the  implementation  of  the  purpose  of  the  domain.  These  competences
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enable the doctor to diagnose, prescribe and cure, the judge to examine cases and pass
judgement, the engineer to build machines, etc. These competences are acquired by
study and/or experience and they precisely characterise the domain’s specialists who
master them. They are out of  the language teacher’s  area of  intervention although
general knowledge about them is of course recommended.
64 On the other hand, the expression of the specialised domain in the language comprises
the countless linguistic means used by domains to serve their purposes and they are
the  teacher’s  domain  par  excellence. They  form  the  main  subject  matter  of  the
methodical  description of  any specialised variety  of  a  language.  Such a  description
would  include  an  introduction  to  the  intentional  universe  of  the  domain  and  its
purpose and to its specialised linguistic and national communities. It would outline its
diachronic  evolution,  including  dictionarisation  processes  if  any.  It  would  list  and
examine  the  different  ways  the  domain  accesses  the  language  to  insert  its  own
specialised  illocutionary  force  into  communication:  specialised  lexis,  terminology,
phraseology,  specialised  discourse,  genres,  registers,  specialised  fiction...  The  study
would examine the culture of the domain to determine if the latter is culture-sensitive
or not and will tentatively chart its encyclopaedia.
65 Specialised encyclopaedias facilitate coded interpretation, and they may be defined as
all potential knowledge necessary to interpret a domain’s specialised communication.
As such, they cannot be exhaustively described although interest in the question is
emerging  (Resche  2013).  Tentative  charting  of  specialised  encyclopaedias  will  offer
teachers and scholars enhanced capacity to interpret specialised communication and
should be included in SL studies. 
66 To conclude on this point, I do not follow authors like Laurence Anthony (2011) who
advocate  minimal  specialist  knowledge  for  SL  teachers.  I  believe  that  ignoring  SL
content and history prevents access to their encyclopaedias, and will result in limited
comprehension of specialised communication and poor interpretive capacity of insider
messages. 
 
4.3. Is FASP specialised language?
67 Specialised fiction, called fiction à substrat professionnel (FASP) in France, has proved a
popular research topic among French SVE practitioners since Michel Petit and Shaeda
Isani opened it at the turn of the century (Petit 1999; Petit & Isani 2004). It appears as
“literature for specialised purposes”, a name proposed by Alan Hirvela, in The Handbook
(2013:  89).  FASP  refers  for  example  to  medical,  legal  or  financial  thrillers  where
specialised environments play a central role in the plots. Petit suggests that they offer
“another  access  to  specialised varieties  of  English”  (1999),  but  objectors  claim that
FASP  is  not  authentic  material  and  should  not  be  used  to  teach  SLs.  This  is  an
interesting  theoretical  debate.  Can  the  present  epistemological  approach  offer
insights?
68 My first answer is that FASP cannot be part of a specialised domain because it is based
on a “null direction of fit” in relation to the objects of the domain (see section 2.1). For
example, medical FASP presupposes that medicine exists. It contains no direct belief or
desire concerning the objects of medicine and does not serve its purpose. Students in
medicine and law do not read FASP to train as doctors and lawyers. Similarly, FASP
discourse is not part of specialised discourse for the same reason: it does not convey
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the intentionality of the domain and its illocutionary force serves narrative fiction, not
a specialised purpose.
69 Yet, FASP works often provide a highly accurate mimesis of domains and SLs. As they
are generally produced by talented insiders, they evoke specialised communities and
cultures in scrupulous detail. Authoritative introductions to specialised worlds are not
always available to SL teachers and learners and they should not be lightly brushed
aside. Yet, the foremost merit of FASP is probably that its enticing verisimilitude is
based on the authors’ thorough mastery of specialised encyclopaedias which are part of
specialised  domains.  I  even  suggest  that  FASP  plots  are  essentially  fictionalised
encyclopaedic  knowledge  because  they  rely  on  an  uncanny  capacity  to  produce  a
discourse made of  a  large quantity of  cross-connecting references.  These close-knit
networks of meaning relate fictional characters to the domain, but also to historical
contexts, sometimes invented, sometimes real. They stimulate specialised questioning
and  interpretation  and  offer  a  valuable,  albeit  indirect,  access  to  specialised
encyclopaedias. Some FASP productions even contribute to social debates in relation to
domains like medicine or law, and they edge close to their intentionalities since these
debates often take place within the specialised communities themselves. Finally, FASP
authors often carefully follow the evolutions of specialised domains and they promptly
adopt linguistic innovations. If we add that many teachers also enjoy FASP teaching
because of the motivating experience it offers to learners, we have a strong case to use




70 This paper proposes theoretical foundations for the study of SLs. As a methodological
prerequisite, it uses Popper’s 3 and Leech’s 4 worlds theories to distinguish carefully
between the different orders of reality where relevant phenomena belong: SLs in social
interaction, specialised communities, SLs as objects of study, specialised domains... In
an admittedly controversial move, it does not opt for language as the initial organising
principle of the theory, but for the concept of specialisation instead. Drawing from the
philosophy of intentionality, it analyses specialisation as a form of intentional state and
successively derives from it the notions of specialised purpose, individual and collective
specialised intentionalities, specialised communities, specialised domains and SLs. The
theory then capitalises on the complementary philosophical and linguistic propositions
of K. Popper, G. Leech, J. Searle and P. Grice to suggest that the functional nature of SLs
is best envisaged through pragmatic analysis.  Specialised pragmatics offers precious
insights into the nature of specialised communication but it remains crudely simple
compared to conversational pragmatics.  Once a specialised context of utterance has
been  identified,  specialised  conventional  implicature  subjects  interpretation  to  the
purpose  of  the  domain  and  specialised  pragmatic  meaning  is  pre-determined  until
contextual change is signalled. The theory helps to establish the primacy of specialised
purpose over communication per se and contributes to understanding the difference
between  general  and  specialised  language.  It  offers  insights  into  the  issue  of  the
specialised  knowledge  that  SL  teachers  should  master,  including  specialised
encyclopaedias, and on the specialised nature of FASP. The main purpose of the theory
is to structure the field as a scientific discipline and to pave the way for the methodical
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description of SLs. It aims at building objective and cumulative knowledge that can be
passed on to future scholars and teachers in the field. It is based on the observation
that the training of SL teachers falls dramatically short of expectations and needs in
many  countries,  and  on  the  belief  that  building  objective  and  constantly  updated
knowledge will make a significantly positive difference in SL research and training.
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ABSTRACTS
The aim of  this  paper is  to  propose epistemological  foundations for  the study of  specialised
languages (SLs) which have gained in global importance over the last sixty years.  In spite of
notable  advances  in  the  field,  the  paper  suggests  that  their  theoretical  foundations  remain
unsatisfactory and that objective knowledge on SLs cannot be properly built, accumulated and
passed on to future teachers. It proposes not to found the domain on language, but on the notion
of specialisation which it interprets as a form of philosophical intentionality. From this premise,
developments examine specialised domains, communities and languages and capitalise on the
advances of pragmatics to account for the functionality of SLs. On these foundations, methodical
descriptions of SLs are expected to be built and disciplinary knowledge structured.
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L’objectif  de  cet  article  est  de  proposer  des  fondements  épistémologiques  pour  l’étude  des
langues spécialisées (LS) qui gagnent en importance dans le monde depuis soixante ans. Malgré
des avancées notables dans le domaine, l’article suggère que leurs fondements théoriques restent
insatisfaisants et que du savoir objectif sur les LS ne peut être correctement construit, accumulé
et transmis aux futurs enseignants. Il propose de fonder le domaine non sur le langage, mais sur
la notion de spécialisation qu’il interprète comme une forme d’intentionnalité philosophique. De
ces prémisses, des développements successifs traitent des domaines, des communautés et des
langues spécialisés et utilisent les avancées de la linguistique pragmatique pour rendre compte
de la fonctionnalité des LS. Sur ces fondements, il est espéré que des descriptions méthodiques
des LS pourront être construites et le savoir disciplinaire structuré.
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Keywords: intentionality, specialised community, specialised encyclopaedia, specialised
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